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ABSTRACT
Ridesharing services, whose aim is to gather travelers with similar itineraries
and compatible schedules, are able to provide substantial environmental and social
benefits through reducing the use of private vehicles. When the operations of a
ridesharing system is optimized, it can also save travelers a significant amount of
transportation cost. The economic benefits associated with ridesharing in turn at-
tract more travelers to participate in ridesharing services and thereby improve the
utilization of transportation infrastructure capacity.
This study addresses two of the most challenging issues in designing an efficient
and sustainable ridesharing service: ridesharing optimization and ridesharing market
design. The first part of the dissertation formally defines the large-scale ridesharing
optimization problem, characterizes its complexity and discusses its relation to classic
relevant problems like the traveling salesman problem (TSP) and the vehicle routing
problem (VRP). A mixed-integer program (MIP) model is developed to solve the
ridesharing optimization problem. Since the ridesharing optimization problem is
NP-hard, the MIP model is not able to solve larger instances within a reasonable
time. An insertion-based heuristic is developed to get approximate solutions to
the ridesharing optimization problem. Experiments showed that ridesharing can
significantly reduce the system-wide travel cost and vehicle trips. Evaluation of the
heuristic solution method showed that the heuristic approach can solve the problem
very fast and provide nearly-optimal (98%) solutions, thus, confirming its efficiency
and accuracy.
From a societal perspective, the ridesharing optimization model proposed in this
dissertation provided substantial system-wide travel cost saving (25%+) and vehicle-
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trip saving (50%) compared to non-ridesharing situation. However, the system-level
optimal solution might not completely align with individual participant interest. The
second part of this dissertation formulates this issue as a fair cost allocation problem
through the lens of the cooperative game theory.
A special property of the cooperative ridesharing game is that, its characteristic
function values are calculated by solving an optimization problem. We characterize
the game to be monotone and subadditive, but non-convex. Several concepts of fair-
ness are investigated and special attention is paid to a solution concept named nucle-
olus, which aims to minimize the maximum dissatisfaction in the system. However,
finding the nucleolus is very challenging because it requires solving the ridesharing
optimization problem for every possible coalition, whose number grows exponentially
as the number of participants increases in the system. We break the cost allocation
(nucleolus finding) problem into a master-subproblem structure and two subprob-
lems are developed to generate constraints for the master problem. We propose a
coalition generation procedure to find the nucleolus and approximate nucleolus of the
game. When the game has a non-empty core, in the approximate nucleolus scheme
the coalitions are computed only when it is necessary, and the approximate nucleolus
scheme produces the actual nucleolus. Experimental results showed that, when the
game has an empty core, the approximate nucleolus is close to the actual nucleolus.
Results also showed that, regardless of the emptiness of the game, by using our algo-
rithm, only a small fraction (1.6%) of the total coalition constraints were generated
to compute the approximate nucleolus, and the approximate nucleolus is close to the
actual nucleolus.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
Travelers today have a number of options when choosing transportation modes
to go from origins to destinations. When selecting a transportation mode, people
usually consider criteria such as cost-efficiency, time, reliability, convenience, etc.
Usually people cannot achieve both cost-efficiency and convenience. For example,
the fixed-route transit (FRT) systems are considered to be cost-efficient because of
their ridesharing attribute and sufficient loading capacity. However, they are incon-
venient because the fixed stops and schedule cannot cater to individual passenger’s
demand. This lack of flexibility is the most significant constraint of FRT. At the
other end of the spectrum, private cars and taxis (demand-responsive transit, or
DRT more generally) are much more flexible and faster offering convenient door-to-
door transportation, at a much higher cost than FRT. Among the transportation
modes, ridesharing (also referred to as carpooling) lies somewhere between the two
ends. Ridesharing combines the fast travel time and convenience of private cars and
the cost-efficiency of fixed-route transit to provide an attractive and viable alterna-
tive.
Ridesharing by definition occurs when travelers share both a private vehicle and
the associated travel cost with others that have similar itineraries and compatible
time schedules. On the one hand, the popularity of smart phones and other ubiq-
uitous computing powers make the efficient sharing and communication of personal
information possible (e.g., location through global positioning systems (GPS)). On
the other hand, ridesharing arises as a viable urban transportation option in the
context of finite oil supplies, rising gas prices, never-ending traffic congestion, and
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environmental concerns. The aim of ridesharing is to improve the efficiency of trans-
portation by bringing together travelers with similar itineraries and schedules. The
following facts make ride-sharing services promising. The private car occupancy
rates are surprisingly low: According to recent reports (see European Environmental
Agency, 2005; Santos et al., 2011), the average car occupancies in Europe and the US
range from 1.8 to 1.1, meaning the vast majority of the trips are actually transporting
“empty seats”. The low-occupancies, together with the large demand for automobile
transportation at peak-hours lead to traffic congestion in many urban areas. Ac-
cording to recent reports by the Texas A&M Transportation Institute (Schrank and
Lomax, 2007; Schrank et al., 2012), the economic loss associated with congestion is
as high as 78 billion and 121 billion dollars in 2007 and 2012, respectively, indicating
a significant increase over years. Besides, private automobiles are also a major source
of fuel consumption and carbon dioxide emissions, which contribute to air pollution
and climate change.
Effective usage of ride-sharing can potentially increase occupancy rates, and thus
mitigate the above-mentioned problems (Morency, 2007). Moreover, the rideshar-
ing system has “scale effects.” As shown by Dailey et al. (1999), the relationship
between the number of ridesharing participants and the number of carpools formed
is quadratic, meaning that ridesharing can have a large effect on traffic demand
management (TDM) if large segments of the population are attracted to the service.
There are already some successful stories in the emerging ridesharing market.
Ridesharing market leader, Uber, who started as a “glorified” taxi company whose
motto was “Everybody’s Private Driver,” is currently shifting its focus to ridesharing
services in major markets. Recent data shows that half of all Uber rides in San
Francisco are for UberPool, which is Uber’s ridesharing service. Other players in the
market, such as Lyft and Sidecar share the same trend.
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Although ridesharing as a transportation solution is promising in a lot of ways,
the operations of ridesharing systems introduce new challenges to both industry and
academia. First, an important objective of a ridesharing system is to minimize the
system-wide total vehicle mileage by gathering travelers with similar itineraries and
compatible schedules. Based on ride sharer information, the system should be able
to make decisions regarding which travelers will be assigned the role of a driver and
what route the drivers should follow regarding picking up and dropping off riders.
An efficient ridesharing system should be able to make these decisions automatically
with the objective of minimizing the system-wide total vehicle mileage. However,
this is a very difficult optimization problem to solve. Second, as the travel costs are
reallocated among the customers, a ridesharing system needs to carefully design a
fair cost allocation scheme to ensure customer satisfaction and induce more travelers
to participate in the system. This problem corresponds to mechanism design in game
theory and again, this is a very challenging problem because the calculation of the
fair cost allocation scheme is highly related to the ridesharing optimization problem.
Neither of the above problems can be solved by existing methodologies. As a result,
this dissertation develops innovative mathematical models and algorithms to handle
these challenges, in the hope of making ridesharing a sustainable and attractive
alternative to private cars.
1.2 Outline
This dissertation is organized as the following. Section 2 gives a comprehen-
sive review of three subjects: (1) the models and solution methods for routing and
scheduling problems in transportation, (2) models, applications and the algorithmic
aspects of game theory, and (3) recent progress in ridesharing study. Section 3 sum-
maries the problems in optimization and mechanism design for ridesharing services
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and provides some background in game theory and mechanism design. Section 4
gives a formal definition of the ridesharing optimization problem, characterizes its
complexity and develops models and algorithms to solve the problem, both accu-
rately and approximately. Experiments are conducted to evaluate the quality of the
developed algorithms. Section 5 is dedicated to the mechanism design problem of
ridesharing. The ridesharing cost allocation problem is formulated through the lens
of cooperative game theory. Several solution concepts about “fairness” in cost allo-
cation are investigated. In particular, an algorithm is developed to find the nucleolus
of the ridesharing game. Conclusions and future research direction are presented in
Section 6.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Mechanism Design
Mechanism design lies in the intersection of computer science and economics. It
looks for overall good solutions in a distributed system where each participant acts
as a self-interested agent with private preferences. Recently mechanism design has
been successfully applied in many areas such as electronic market design and resource
allocation problems. A typical goal in mechanism design is to provide incentives to
participants to promote truth revelation from agents.
In one sentence, mechanism design is the inverse of game theory: It is the art
of designing a game (a mechanism) in which a given desired outcome is achieved in
equilibrium, i.e., the state from which no player has the incentive to deviate.
Mechanism designers have many “desired outcomes” to choose from. However,
most of the mechanisms are focused on two objectives:
1. In social welfare-maximizing (i.e., efficient) mechanism design, the goal is to
assign the items to the bidders with the highest value.
2. In revenue-maximizing (i.e., optimal) mechanism design, the goal is to achieve
as much revenue as possible for the agency in charge of creating and awarding
bids, i.e., the auctioneer.
Vickrey (1961), in his seminal paper, gave an efficient mechanism for a single-
item auction: Assign the item to the bidder with the highest bid, and charge him the
second highest price. Naturally, this kind of auction is coined as the second-price or
Vickrey auction. A Vickrey auction has two desirable properties: It achieves social
welfare optimality and at the equilibrium, all bidders give their true values for the
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item. For its simple allocation and payment rules, the Vickrey auction is easy to
implement.
Groves mechanisms (Groves, 1973) have played and will continue to play an
important role in mechanism design. Groves mechanisms can be implemented to
maximize the total value over all participants — meaning Groves mechanisms are ef-
ficient. Besides, the Groves mechanisms are strategy-proof, meaning truth-revealing
is a dominant strategy for each participant, regardless of the strategies taken by
other players. However, the value-maximization problem can only be solved after
all the participants report their complete information. Because of its combinatorial
nature, the Groves mechanism is computationally intractable. And any attempts
trying to increase its computability (e.g., relax the requirement of complete informa-
tion revelation) could easily compromise the mechanism’s game-theoretic properties
(e.g., the strategy-proofness). A step up is the Vickrey, Clarke and Groves (VCG)
mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), which is generalized from the
Vickrey auction for multiple items. The VCG mechanism charges each bidder the
harm they cause to other bidders (i.e., their negative externality) and is both efficient
and incentive compatible. However, implementing VCG mechanism is computation-
ally infeasible (see Nisan and Ronen, 2000). The computational issues of mechanism
design has been gaining the attention of theoretical computer scientists since Nisan
and Ronen (1999) opened up the field of algorithmic mechanism design. Algorithmic
mechanism design addresses the mechanism design problem from a computer sci-
entist’s perspective in which worst-case analysis and approximation techniques are
used. Recent progress has been focused on the gap between approximability and
incentive compatibility (see Papadimitriou et al., 2008; Dobzinski, 2011; Dobzinski
and Vondrak, 2012; Dughmi et al., 2011)
For optimal mechanism design, which is focused on revenue-maximization, My-
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erson (1981) in his landmark paper solved the auction design problem to achieve
the highest expected revenue at equilibrium. Inspired by the results of Myerson
(1981) showing that the optimal single-item auction for players with independent
private values is simply the Vickrey auction with reserve prices, computer scien-
tists followed up by generalizing the auction settings. These efforts include Chawla
et al. (2007) and Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) who relaxed the assumptions on
bidders’ value distribution and proposed VCG-based mechanisms that reasonably ap-
proximated the optimal expected revenue. Unlike mechanism design problems, whose
results are dependent on the distribution of bidders’ valuations, prior-free auctions
further relax the settings and assume no distribution over bidders’ valuations before
the bid. Worst-case approximation analysis is commonly seen in prior-free auction
design problems and the resultant revenues are often compared to the well-known
benchmark mechanism (Goldberg et al., 2006). Hartline and Roughgarden (2008)
proposed a Bayesian optimal mechanism-based framework that is near-optimal and
prior-free. Leonardi and Roughgarden (2012) designed a prior-free multiple goods
auction with ordered bidders and gave its expected revenue compared with some
benchmarking results.
Note that most of the optimal mechanism design research in the literature was
focused on single-item auctions due to the complexity issues. This is one of the
challenges we’ll face in the mechanism design for ridesharing services because in the
ridesharing context we generally have multiple auctioneers (drivers) with multiple
items (passenger seats) for sale. Another challenge is due to the impossibility of
finding an efficient mechanism which is both incentive compatible and individually
rational without external subsides (Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983).
The most business-wise successful application of mechanism design might be the
generalized second-price (GSP) mechanism. The GSP mechanism is the current in-
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dustry standard for search engine (e.g., Google, Yahoo!) advertisement allocation as
it practically generates stable allocation results. This mechanism was first proposed
in a static framework in which a single auction with a small number of slots were
allocated at the same time. Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) independently
developed this mechanism and analyzed its equilibrium. Note that unlike VCG mech-
anism, the GSP is not truthful, meaning truth-revealing is not a dominant strategy
for players.
2.2 Mechanism Design in Ridesharing
This research area has been largely ignored by the transportation research com-
munity until very recently. The author only found two applications of mechanism
design in ridesharing. One is due to Kamar and Horvitz (2009) who proposed the
agent-based carpooling (ABC) system that dynamically generates ride-share plans
and encourages fair payments based on a VCG mechanism. However, this VCG mech-
anism needs to compute optimal outcomes to ensure truthfulness, and the problem
itself is NP-complete (Nisan and Ronen (2000)). Thus, it is computationally infea-
sible to implement such a mechanism in a dynamic environment in which frequent
computation on payments is necessary. To address the intractability, the ABC system
makes a series of approximations such as calculating local VCG payments instead
of global VCG payments and calculating the payments based on an approximation
method used by Nisan and Ronen (2000). In this way however, their payment mech-
anism is not truthful.
Kleiner et al. (2011) proposed an auction scheme for dynamic ride-sharing with
one-driver-one-passenger setting. They showed that their system is incentive-compatible
and allows trade-off between the minimization of vehicle mileage traveled and the
overall successful matching rate. However, their work needs to be extended to
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multiple-passenger-multiple-driver before its can be implemented in the real world.
More recently, Wang (2013) studied the stability issue in the optimal ridesharing
matching problem. To the extent of our knowledge, no previous work has been
published on the general ridesharing problems with a multiple-passenger-multiple-
driver-flexible-role setting.
2.3 Algorithmic Studies on Ridesharing-related Problems
As will be shown later, the mechanism design problem is closely related to the
ridesharing optimization problem with specific objective functions. So there’s a need
to conduct a literature review on algorithmic studies related to rideharing problems.
The ridesharing problem is closely related to the pickup and delivery problem (PDP,
see Savelsbergh and Sol (1995) for a review). Extensive studies of PDP can be found
in the literature. Many of the studies involve integer programming-based exact al-
gorithms. Sexton and Bodin (1985) reported an exact algorithm based on Bender’s
decomposition. Cordeau (2006) developed an MIP formulation for a related problem
of PDP – the multi-vehicle Dial-a-Ride Problem (DARP). A branch-and-cut algo-
rithm using valid inequalities was proposed by him. Cordeau and Laporte (2003)
examined and compared different mathematical formulations and solution methods.
Lu and Dessouky (2004) developed an MIP formulation for the multiple-vehicle PDP.
New valid inequalities were utilized to develop a branch-and-cut algorithm to opti-
mally solve the problem. Cortes et al. (2010) presented a strict MIP formulation
for the PDP and allow passengers to transfer. Berbeglia et al. (2010) gave a com-
prehensive review on dynamic PDP and discussed solution strategies. Quadrifoglio
et al. (2008) developed an MIP formulation for the static single-vehicle Mobility Al-
lowance Shuttle Transit (MAST) system (a variant of the PDP system). Logic cuts
were proposed by the authors to strengthen the formulation and solve the problem.
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Other exact algorithms include dynamic programming. Psaraftis developed dynamic
programming techniques to solve the DARP (Psaraftis, 1980) and DARP with time
windows (Psaraftis, 1983). These two algorithms have a complexity of O(N23N)
(here N stands for the number of customers) and can solve instances of up to 20
customers within a reasonable time. Besides, Teodorovic and Radivojevic (2000)
developed a fuzzy logic approach for the DAR problem. Wang (2013) modeled the
single-driver, single-rider ridesharing optimization problem as a maximum-weight
bipartite matching problem.
Due to the fact that PDP is strongly NP-hard (Lenstra and Kan, 1981), besides
exact solution methods, the research community have been focusing on heuristic
approaches that can solve large instances of PDP in polynomial time, while main-
taining the quality of the solution. Insertion heuristics are very important and pop-
ular among the heuristic approaches, not only because of their fast running time,
but also due to their applicability and implementability in dynamic environments
(Campbell and Savelsbergh, 2004). Efforts in insertion heuristics include a insertion-
based construction heuristic for multiple-vehicle PDP by Lu and Dessouky (2006).
One disadvantage of insertion heuristics is that it is difficult to quantitatively evalu-
ate their performance. Another disadvantage is due to its myopic and greedy nature
when searching for local optimum. Quadrifoglio et al. (2007) resolved this disad-
vantage efficiently by introducing an insertion heuristic with the concept of “usable
slack time”. Some efforts have been put to evaluate the performance of heuristics
through worst-case analysis. These efforts can be found in PDP and more funda-
mental problems such as TSP. Through constructing a minimum spanning tree and
an Euler tour, Christofides (1976) developed a O(n3) heuristic with worst-case ra-
tio of 3/2 for metric-TSP (TSP whose cost matrix satisfies the triangle inequality).
Rosenkrantz et al. (1977) analyzed the approximation ratio of the cheapest insertion
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heuristic and several other heuristics for TSP. Archetti et al. (2003) did research
on the re-optimization version of TSP in which a new node is added to or removed
from an optimal solution. They proved that the worst-case ratio of the cheapest
insertion heuristic decreases from 2 (Rosenkrantz et al., 1977) to 3/2 when applied
to the re-optimization version of TSP. Arora (1998) developed a polynomial time
approximation scheme (PTAS) for Euclidean TSP, which is currently the best result
on approximating TSP.
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3. DEFINITIONS AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We begin this section by summarizing the challenges of optimization and mech-
anism design for ridesharing:
1. The valuations of the customers largely depend on the actual assignment of
the ridesharing plan.
2. The mechanism design problem is closely related to the optimization problem of
ridesharing. For example, a VCG-based mechanism has its desired properties
(efficiency, individually-rational, and strategy-proof) only if the ridesharing
assignment solved from the optimization model is actually optimal.
3.1 Ridesharing Settings
There are two types of participants in ridesharing: riders and drivers. Drivers
use their vehicles to provide ride-sharing offers. Riders place requests to be matched
to an offer. A service is a procedure to make those matches happen, which could be
a website based on social networks.
There are four basic arrangements of ridesharing services, namely:
• Single Rider, Single Driver
• Single Driver, Multiple Riders
• Single Rider, Multiple Drivers
• Multiple Driver, Multiple Riders
This research will focus on the multiple-driver-multiple-rider setting. The fol-
lowing notation is commonly used to address the optimization matching problem of
ridesharing.
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Given a set of locations L, travel times tij and distances dij between each pair of
locations i, j ∈ L, let D be the set of drivers; R, the set of riders, and P = D ∪ R,
the set of all agents in a ridesharing system. Each driver d ∈ D (rider r ∈ R) wants
to travel from his origin (start location) ld,s ∈ L (lr,s ∈ L) to his destination (end
location) ld,e ∈ L (lr,e ∈ L). Each driver d ∈ D (rider r ∈ R) has an earliest time
et(d) (et(r)) from which she may leave her origin and a latest time lt(d) (lt(r)) at
which she may arrive at his destination. The range [et(d), lt(d)] is called the time
window.
Figure 3.1: A matching with detour
Figure 3.1 illustrates the detouring cost associated with a successful ridesharing
matching. The original cost of the driver without ridesharing with the rider is:
dst. The cost of the rider is ds′t′ . With ridesharing, the joint trip length becomes
dss′ + ds′t′ + dt′t. From the driver’s point of view, the detouring cost is thus dss′ +
ds′t′ + dt′t − dst. Since the driver is always suffering a loss equal to the detouring
cost, the runner of the service has to pay the drivers for their loss. The business
runner can use the fees collected from the riders to subsidize the drivers. From the
perspective of the business runner, an important issue of the mechanism design is
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how to subsidize the driver to attract more users to participate in the service, and
at the same time, maximize the profit of ridesharing matching.
3.1.1 Ridesharing system objective
The objective of the system is to minimize the system-wide mileage, which is the
total mileage traveled by all users. This objective is meaningful from a social per-
spective because total vehicle mileage is critically related to air pollution (emissions)
and road congestion. Also, note that this objective is closely related to minimizing
total travel costs, or alternatively speaking, maximizing total travel cost savings,
which is the direct motivation of ridesharing participants.
3.2 Mechanism Design Problem
The mechanism designs how much each participant has to pay for the shared ride.
We design mechanisms that have the following properties: For drivers, cost is shared
and perhaps, some income is gained; for passengers, their transportation needs are
satisfied without driving their own cars.
3.2.1 Value of a shared-ride for an agent
Let P be the set of participants in a ridesharing system and S ∈ P be a ridesharing
group. Denote by R(S) the set of all the feasible ridesharing tours for S. Here a
ridesharing tour R ∈ R(S) decides which participant in S will be assigned as the
driver and gives the pick-up and drop-off sequence for all the riders. The value of a
shared-ride for an agent pi ∈ S is defined as the cost savings associated with switching
from driving a vehicle from origin to destination to participating in a ridesharing
tour. Let C0(pi) be pi’s cost for an individual trip if he doesn’t participate in any
ridesharing. Let C(pi, R) be the cost of pi for ridesharing tour R, then pi puts a
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value on ridesharing tour R that is equal to
vi(R) = C
0(pi)− C(pi, R)
It is noted that the cost of agent i should include the following components:
1. Agent i’s driving cost including fuel cost and vehicle usage.
2. A cognitive inconvenience cost for being a driver.
Note that the fuel cost and the vehicle usage is closely related to the driving miles.
It is also observed that agent i’s cognitive inconvenience cost for being a driver can
also be measured by the mileage he drives, as the inconvenience cost should increase
as the driving miles accumulate. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that each
participant i’s travel cost is proportional to his driving miles. Since in any ridesharing
tour R ∈ R(S), the only one that is driving is the driver pd ∈ S, then we have
C(pi, R) = 0, ∀pi ∈ S\{pd}.
Then it is not hard to see that for every agent who is not matched to any rideshar-
ing tour, his value is
vi(R) = C
0(pi)− C(pi, R) = C0(pi)− C0(pi) = 0
The cumulative value of a ridesharing tour R is the summation of the values of
all the agents for participating in the ridesharing.
V (R) =
∑
pi∈S
vi(R)
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3.2.2 Mechanism design preliminaries
Before getting into the mechanism design for ridesharing, we first introduce some
definitions for the desired properties of the ridesharing mechanism.
Definition 3.1 (Truthfulness). A mechanism is truthful if any agent’s equilibrium
strategy is to report his true value for shared-ride plan R to the system,
vˆi(R) = vi(R), for ∀pi ∈ P
Definition 3.2 ((Ex post) Individual Rationality). A mechanism is ex post individ-
ual rational if no agent loses money by participating in the ridesharing,
vi(R
∗) ≥ ρi, for ∀pi ∈ P,
where R∗ is the equilibrium ridesharing plan and ρi is the value of pi if there is no
ridesharing.
Definition 3.3 (Weak budget-balance). A mechanism is weakly budget balanced
when no external subsidy is required to maintain the operations of the ridesharing
system, ∑
pi∈P
ρi ≥ 0
3.3 Mechanism Design Problem in Ridesharing
Many online ridesharing matching agencies use simple payment mechanisms such
as sharing fuel costs among passengers (see Furuhataa et al., 2013). These simple
mechanisms are easy to implement but are not capable of incorporating personal
preferences because of individually-different cognitive costs. Moreover, these pay-
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ment schemes are not truth-revealing since participants may deceptively report their
own value in hopes of biasing the ridesharing plans for their own good.
Designing a payment mechanism that has the game theoretic virtues for a dy-
namic ridesharing system is challenging. First of all, Myerson and Satterthwaite
(1983) proved the impossibility of finding an efficient mechanism that is both incen-
tive compatible and individually rational without external subsides. Second, compu-
tationally expensive payment mechanisms that require optimal outcome calculations
are not practically implementable in a dynamic ridesharing system.
According to the VCG mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973),
each participant of the ridesharing service is charged the harm he causes to the social
welfare (his externality). Let V ∗∗−i be the cumulative value of the rideshare plans of
all the agents except pi, and V
∗
−i is the cumulative value of the system when pi is not
participating in ridesharing. Then agent pi’s payment is:
ρi = V
∗∗
−i − V ∗−i
On the condition that the rideshare plan calculated by the optimization problem
is optimal, this VCG-based plan has the following properties:
• Efficiency – Social welfare is maximized. This is achieved by solving the opti-
mization problem.
• Individual rationality – All agents have non-negative utility by participating in
ridesharing.
• Strategy-proof – Truth-telling is a dominant strategy for each agent regardless
of what strategy other players are taking.
There are several challenges when solving the mechanism design problem. First,
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payments usually need to be repeatedly calculated in a dynamic ridesharing set-
ting. Second, to ensure truthfulness, the embedded optimization problem, which
maximizes social benefits (NP-hard in its nature) needs to be solved.
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4. RIDESHARING OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
4.1 Introduction
In a large-scale ridesharing system, we assume that all the customers that are
considered in the optimization problem are time-compatible. This assumption is
realistic when the time windows are sufficiently large and travelers are less sensitive
to time windows (e.g, end of business days). Furthermore, the proposed optimization
problem has a nice sub-structure. That is, it can be easily divided into smaller
subproblems with similar structure whose customers share similar time schedule and
solved in a parallel algorithm fashion.
4.1.1 Ridesharing system objectives
The objective of the ridesharing organizer is to minimize the system-wide mileage,
which is the total mileage traveled by all users. This objective is meaningful from a
social perspective because total vehicle mileage is critically related to the air pollution
(emissions) and road congestion. Note that this objective is also closely related to
minimizing total travel costs, or alternatively speaking, maximizing total travel cost
savings, which is the direct motivation of ridesharing participants. And we will later
show that this system-wise objective has an alignment with individual participant’s
interest - minimizing personal travel cost.
4.1.2 Problem definition
Let P be the set of participants in a ridesharing system. Each participant i ∈ P
wants to travel from his origin si to his destination ti. Let Vs = {si|i ∈ P}, Vt =
{ti|i ∈ P}, and the entire location set V = Ls ∪ Lt. Let A = V × V denote the
edge set connecting all the vertices in V and C ∈ R|V |×|V | denote the cost matrix
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with cij representing traveling cost from location i to j. Then we have a complete
graph G = (V,A) and its edge cost matrix C as input. To formally introduce the
ridesharing optimization problem, we first present some definitions.
Definition 4.1 (ridesharing tour). Let S ⊆ P be a ridesharing group and let V (S)
denote the location set of customers in S, therefore V (S) = ∪i∈S(si∪ ti). A rideshar-
ing tour for ridesharing group S, R(S) is a directed Hamiltonian path on the graph
G(S) = (V (S), A(S)) where A(S) = V (S)× V (S) such that
1. R(S) starts from agent d’s origin s(d) and ends at d’s destination t(d).
2. Let S−d = S\{d}. For every agent i in S−d, s(i) precedes t(i).
Note that the above definition implies that agent d is assigned as the driver in
the ridesharing group S.
Definition 4.2 (ridesharing partition). A ridesharing partition SP = {S1, . . . , Sm}
is a set of ridesharing groups such that
1. ∪Sj∈SPSj = P
2. Sj ∩ Sk = Ø 1 ≤ j 6= k ≤ m
Definition 4.3 (ridesharing plan). A ridesharing plan for a ridesharing partition
SP is a set of ridesharing tours RP = {R(Sj)|Sj ∈ SP}
Define f(RP ) as the value of ridesharing plan RP that corresponds to a function
f . Define the objective function of the ridesharing optimization problem as:
max{f(RP )}
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In this research f is the accumulated social values of all the ridesharing tours,
which is defined by:
f(RP (SP )) =
∑
Sj∈SP
V (R(Sj)) (4.1)
Definition 4.4 (ridesharing optimization problem (RSP)). An optimization problem
of ridesharing is a 4-tuple 〈IQ, SQ, fQ, optQ〉, where:
• IQ: the set of the participants P and the corresponding graph G = (V,A)
• SQ: the set of all ridesharing plans for all the ridesharing partitions of P
• fQ: f(RP ) is the value of ridesharing plan RP
• optQ: max.
4.1.3 Cost and value of a shared-ride for an agent
Recall from Section 3, for every agent who is not matched to any ridesharing
tour, his value is
vi(R) = C
0(pi)− C(pi, R) = C0(pi)− C0(pi) = 0
On the other hand, for an agent that is matched in a ridesharing tour, his value
is
vi(R) =

C0(pi), ∀pi ∈ S\{pd},
C0(pi)− d(R), pi = pd.
Here d(R) is the tour length of R.
The cumulative value of a ridesharing tour R is the summation of the values of
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all the agents for participating in the ridesharing.
V (R) =
∑
pi∈S
vi(R)
=
∑
pi∈S
C0(pi)− d(R)
=
∑
pi∈S
d(pi)− d(R)
Given a set of ridesharing group S ⊆ P and suppose the ridesharing organizer
wants to maximize the cumulative value of S. Since d(pi) is a constant for every pi ∈
S when S is given, this objective is equivalent to minimizing d(R). And minimizing
d(R) is equivalent to finding the optimal solution for the corresponding TSP on
S with pick-up and drop-off precedence constraints. We call the optimal solution
for this problem the optimal ridesharing tour of S and denote it as C∗(S). The
associated value of C∗(S) is called the optimal value of S and is denoted by V ∗(S).
Now suppose the given set of ridesharing participants P has formed m ridesharing
groups. Let SP = {S1, . . . , Sm} denote the set of these groups. Then we must have
∪Sj∈SPSj = P and Sj ∩ Sk = Ø for every 1 ≤ j 6= k ≤ m. Note that here SP is also
known as a partition of P . We define the cumulative value of the participant set P
under a partition SP as the sum of the optimal values of sets in SP , that is
VSP (P ) =
∑
Sj∈SP
V ∗(Sj)
Now suppose the ridesharing organizer is more ambitious, not only it wants to
maximize V (R) for a given ridesharing group S ⊆ P , instead it aims to maximize the
cumulative value of P . This objective is equivalent to find the optimal set partition
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SP ∗ such that
SP ∗ = arg max
SPi∈SP(P )
VSPi(P )
4.2 Modeling
4.2.1 Setting
The ridesharing organizer seeks to minimize system-wide total vehicle traveling
miles, namely the total driven miles by all the ridesharing users, either in a shared
ride or in a solo drive if unmatched.
Unlike cab-drivers that are hired by a company, drivers in a ridesharing service are
independent users. Suppose we have n ridesharing participants P = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Each of them has a origin location and a destination location. Denote the node
set of origin and destination locations as VO and VD, respectively. Let node i be
customer i’s origin node (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and i+n be his destination node, then we have
VO = {1, 2, . . . , n} and VD = {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , 2n}.
Then we have a complete digraph GR = (VR, AR), where VR = VO ∪ VD is the set
of all nodes and AR = VR × VR is the set of all edges. Let CR ∈ R2n×2n be the cost
matrix with c0ij representing the travel cost from node i to node j.
Figure 4.1 provides an illustration showing two feasible solutions to RSP on GR.
Note that the number in a node indicates its associated customer index. Nodes with
a rectangular shape and a “+” label represent the destinations. Figure 4.1(a) is a
solution that consists of individual trips (no ridesharing at all). On the other hand,
in Figure 4.1(b) customers 1 and 2 form a ridesharing group and customers 4, 5 and
6 form a ridesharing group. Nodes in red belong to the customers that are assigned
as drivers.
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Figure 4.1: (a) Individual trips vs. (b) organized ridesharing trips
4.2.2 Hardness
Theorem 4.1. RSP is NP-hard.
Proof. Given a case in the 3-set covering problem, we can construct a RSP case like
this. For a given case P in the 3-partition problem, where U = {e1, e2, . . . , en} is
the finite element set, and S = {S1, S2, . . . , Sm} is the collection of sets of U . Each
Sj ∈ S is associated with a cost c(Sj). Note that this includes singletons. For any
X ⊆ S, let C(X ) denote the total costs of the sets in X , i.e., C(X ) = ∑Sj∈X c(Sj).
The objective function of problem P is to find the X ⊆ S with smallest cost that
covers each element exactly once. It is known that this problem is NP-hard (Karp,
1972), and P can be reduced to RSP in the following way.
For any given case of P , we construct a case of RSP P0 like this. We build a
graph G = (V,E) where V = U+U ′, here U is still the finite element set as in P , and
U ′ is the set formed by corresponding “destination” of each element in U . For every
element e ∈ U , we have a corresponding destination as e′, and we set the distance
c0(ee
′) = c(e). For every duplet, triplet and above in S, that we denote it by S in P,
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in P0 we have c0(S) = c(S). Here c0(S) denotes the cost of the optimal ridesharing
tour (as defined before) of the nodes in S. Because a solution to the RSP on G (P0)
includes a solution to the optimal set covering problem on U (P ), and the latter is
NP-hard, we can conclude that RSP is NP-hard as well.
4.2.3 Transformation
The RSP is transformed to the single-depot multiple traveling salesman problem
with pickup and delivery constraints (SDMTSP-PD) in the following manner. Let
V0 = {0} be a “dummy” depot. The transformed graph is represented by G = (V,A)
where V = VR ∪ {V0} and A is the set of all the directed edges connecting any two
vertices in V . The cost of the arcs in A is defined as
cij =

0, if i = 0 or j = 0,
c0ij, otherwise.
Then the solution in Figure 4.1(b) is equivalent to the solution in Figure 4.2,
where dash lines indicate zero-cost arcs. Since SDMTSP-PD is NP-hard, RSP is
NP-hard too.
4.2.4 Integer program
In this section, we introduce an integer program for the transformed SDMTSP-
PD problem.
For each edge (i, j) ∈ A we define a binary variable xij such that
xij =

1, if (i, j) ∈ A is in the solution,
0, otherwise.
Then we can immediately perform some reductions on the problem.
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Figure 4.2: Corresponding feasible solution for SDMTSP-PD on the transformed
graph
Lemma 4.1. Given G = (V,A) and P = (V,R), then
(I) x0j = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ R
(II) xi0 = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ R
(III) xji = 0 ∀(i, j) ∈ R
Proof. Obvious.
Additionally, we define a binary variable yik as follows
yik =

1, if node i is visited by driver k, i ∈ V \{0}, k ∈ VO
0, otherwise.
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Note that here yik = 1 implies customer i is a driver. Thus constraints that
connect y variables and x variables need to be added in the integer program.
min Z =
∑
(i,j)∈A
cijxij (4.2)
2n∑
i=0
xij = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , n (4.3)
2n∑
j=0
xij = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (4.4)
x0i − x(i+n)0 = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (4.5)
ui − uj + pxij ≤ p− 1, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (4.6)
ui < ui+n, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (4.7)∑
k
yik = 1, i = 1, . . . , 2n; k = 1, . . . , n (4.8)
yik = y(i+n)k, i = 1, . . . , n; k = 1, . . . , n (4.9)
x0i = yii, i = 1, . . . , n (4.10)
xij ≤M1(1− zij), 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (4.11)
−M2zij ≤ yik − yjk ≤M2zij, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n; k = 1, . . . , n (4.12)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (4.13)
yik ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , 2n; k = 1, . . . , n (4.14)
zij ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (4.15)
Constraints (4.3) and (4.4) are the continuity constraints. Constraints (4.5) make
sure that a tour starts at its driver’s origin and ends at his destination. Constraints
(4.6) are a group of subtour-elimination constraints (SECs) first proposed by Miller
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et al. Miller et al. (1960). Here ui are continuous variables called node potentials
that indicate the visit order of node i in the tour, while p denotes the maximal
number of nodes a driver can visit in a tour. This parameter can be used to specify
the seat capability of drivers. Generally in a typical dynamic ridesharing setting
where most participating vehicles are private vehicles whose seats are fewer that 5,
p won’t exceed 10. Constraints (4.7) ensure that a customer’s origin precedes his
destination. Constraints (4.8) ensure that each node is visited by exactly one driver.
Constraints (4.9) make sure that a customer’s origin and destination are visited by
the same driver. Constraints (4.10) mean that customer i is selected as a driver
if and only if his origin is visited by himself. The intuitive meaning of constraints
(4.11) and (4.12) is that if edge (i, j) is selected in the solution then nodes i, j must
be served by the same driver. This set of constraints serve as a bridge between x
variables and y variables. Here M1 and M2 are large numbers.
4.3 Solution Methods
4.3.1 Profitability of ridesharing
Since the ridesharing problem aims to combine trips with similar itineraries to-
gether to save total travel cost, a natural question to ask is, when does ridesharing
makes the greatest economic sense, and thus should be encouraged, and in what case
should inefficient ridesharing be discouraged. The following example illustrates this
thought.
In Figure 4.3(a), the total travel cost assuming no ridesharing happens is dSDtD +
dSP tP = 10. When P,D decide to do share a ride, the optimal route yields a travel
cost of 9 (e.g. SD−SP − tP − tD), resulting a cost saving equal to 1. In Figure 4.3(b)
however, the optimal route has a travel cost of 11, resulting a cost loss equal to 1
instead of cost saving.
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(a) Profitable ridesharing
(b) Nonprofitable ridesharing
Figure 4.3: A two-player example
From this example we know that, the profitability of ridesharing depends largely
on the relative geographical location of the participants. To generalize our obser-
vation, we conclude that, for a two-player ridesharing to be profitable, the com-
bined route cost must be less than the sum of the two solo trip costs. That is,
dSDSP + dtDtP + dSP tP < dSDtD + dSP tP , i.e. dSDSP + dtDtP < dSDtD . This is equivalent
to say, the cost saving of ridesharing, dSDtD − (dSDSP +dtDtP ), has to be greater than
0.
4.3.2 One-to-one match
Recall that the objective of minimizing total travel cost is equivalent to maxi-
mizing total cost saving. The above observation motivates Wang (2013) to solve an
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alternate version of ridesharing optimization problem: the optimal rideshare match-
ing problem. In the optimal rideshare match problem, each customer can be matched
with at most another customer to form a shared-ride. Obviously, the solution to this
problem must have a greater cost than the solution to the ridesharing optimization
problem. Nevertheless, the solution to this problem can provide insight to solving
the ridesharing optimization problem and can serve as a benchmark to our proposed
heuristic solution methods.
The optimal ridesharing matching problem (see Wang, 2013) can be modeled on
a graph. Let G = (V,A) be a digraph with V = {1, . . . , N} standing for the set
of customers and A = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ V } representing the possible rideshare match
between agent i and j. A directed arc (i, j),∀i, j ∈ V is associated with an edge
cost cij equal to the cost saving when i serves as the driver and j as the rider in the
i− j rideshare match. The objective function of this problem aims to maximize the
cost savings of rideshare matches over all possibilities:
∑
(i,j)∈A cijxij. Here xij is a
binary decision variable that is defined as
xij =

1, if rideshare match (i, j) ∈ A is selected,
0, otherwise.
The constraints of this optimization model can be represented by
∑
j∈V \{i} xij +∑
j∈V \{i} xji ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ V .
4.3.3 An insertion heuristic
Note that the optimal matching solution in Section 4.3.2 is not necessarily the op-
timal solution to the RSP. Apparently, as long as the vehicle capacity is not reached,
the route plan could be further improved by inserting unmatched customers. The
following example shows that the further improvement through insertion is possible.
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(a) An optimal match (b) Insertion
Figure 4.4: A profitable insertion
The optimal match solution by solving the optimization model in Section 4.3.2 is
represented in Figure 4.4(a). This solution can be potentially further improved. As
is shown in Figure 4.4(b), when a third customer (customer 3) participates in the
system, the total travel cost can be saved by including 3 into the existing route of 1
and 2. The saved cost by including traveler 3 is d22 − d23 − d2′3′ = 3.
The observation from Figure 4.4 motivates the researchers to develop an insertion-
based heuristic to improve the solution to the ridesharing optimization problem.
Insertion heuristic is an efficient algorithm for solving transportation routing and
scheduling problems. The basic idea of insertion-based heuristic involves finding
the “cheapest” feasible insertion position in an existing route. Jaw et al. (1986)
first adapted the traditional insertion approach to solve the multi-vehicle dial-a-
ride problem with time windows. Insertion-based constructive heuristic has then
been developed to solve the pickup and delivery problem with time windows (Lu
and Dessouky, 2006), the single-vehicle mobility allowance shuttle transit service
(MAST) scheduling problem (Quadrifoglio et al., 2007), and the multiple-vehicle
MAST problem (Lu et al., 2011).
The insertion-based heuristic algorithm we develop is based on the optimal match-
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ing solution found in Section 4.3.2. After the optimal matching solution is obtained,
for each of the unmatched participant, the algorithm loop through all the existing
routes to find a feasible insertion position that has the greatest cost saving. This
process repeats until either no unmatched participant is left or an insertion position
with positive cost saving cannot be found. The input of the algorithm is the locations
of the customers and the optimal matching solution as found in Section 4.3.2. The
output of the algorithm is the improved ridesharing solution (a route plan). This
insertion heuristic is formally described in Algorithm 4.1.
4.4 Experiments
We implemented the algorithms in Java with CPLEX 12.6 and the Concert li-
brary. The data set1 we used in the experiments were selected from Dumitrescu et al.
(2010). The origins and destinations of customers were randomly generated in the
square [0, 1000] × [0, 1000]. The Euclidean distances were used. The instances are
named probnX, where n is the customer size and X stands for different instances
with the same customer size. The (partial) experimental results are summarized in
Table 4.1.
Both the optimal matching and the insertion heuristic are able to find the solu-
tions instantly (in less than 1 second). So in Table 4.1 we focus on how much time
the MIP model spends on finding the optimal solutions. Because RSP is NP-hard,
not all prob10 instances can be solved to optimality within the 3600s time limit. For
those could not be solved to optimality, the integral gap ranged from 5% to 16%. It
is noteworthy to point out that the solution obtained from the insertion heuristic is
not far from the optimal solution via solving MIP: for all the prob5X instances and
the instance of prob10c, the insertion heuristic actually found the optimal solution;
1The data sets can be downloaded from http://www.diku.dk/~sropke/
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for prob10d, the gap between the insertion heuristic solution and the MIP solution
was only 1.64%.
To further compare the solution qualities of insertion heuristic (Insertion) and
optimal matching (Match) in terms of cost saving, the average solution values for
each problem size are summarized in Table 4.2. The percentage in parenthesis for
each solution method indicates the cost saving percentage compared to the non-
ridesharing route plan (Solo). It can be seen that Insertion always outperforms
Match, and can further save about 5 percent of the total travel cost – a non-trivial
amount of mileage.
Table 4.3 summarizes the saved vehicle trips by adopting ridesharing. As can
be seen, Match and Insertion can save 20% - 38% and 24% - 55% vehicle trips on
road respectively, depending on the problem size. Once again, Insertion always beats
Match by a significant margin (as high as 18%). Also note that the percentage of
vehicle trips saving increases as the problem size – a fact that confirms the scale
effect of ridesharing.
4.5 Conclusions
In this section we approached ridesharing problem from the service provider’s
point of view. Particularly, we try to answer the question that, given the participants’
origin and destination, how should the service provider organize (assign driver/rider
role and suggest a route) the ridesharing, with the objective of minimizing system-
wide travel cost? This problem may well arise in the context of large-scale, dynamic
ridesharing. Although ridesharing service provider may face this challenging prob-
lem, it has never been studied in the literature. The authors formally defined this
problem as the ridesharing optimization problem (RSP) and showed how to trans-
form RSP to the single-depot multiple traveling salesman problem with pickup and
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delivery constraints (SDMTSP-PD). A mixed-integer problem (MIP) model was then
developed for RSP.
Since RSP is NP-hard, we resort to approximation algorithms to solve the problem
with larger size. An insertion-based heuristic is developed based on the optimal
matching solution (see Wang, 2013). The insertion heuristic was then compared with
optimal matching solution and the optimal solution of RSP MIP. We found that the
insertion heuristic can consistently save more mileage than optimal matching, and
the gap between the heuristic solution and the MIP optimal solution was very small,
thus confirmed the effectiveness of the insertion heuristic. It is also found out that it
can save a significantly large amount of vehicle trips by adopting ridesharing. In our
experiments, the insertion algorithm can save vehicle trips by up to 55%, putting
more than half of the cars on road back to garage. We also found that ridesharing
has scale effect, as the percentage of vehicle trip-saving increases as more customers
join the ridesharing service.
The researchers identify several future research directions on the ridesharing op-
timization problem. The special structure of the RSP MIP model is still to be inves-
tigated and exploited, thus developing valid inequalities and logic cuts is a promising
direction. The insertion heuristic has the potential to be further improved by better
and deeper understanding of the characteristics of RSP. We note that the experi-
ments conducted in this section were using totally randomly-generated geographical
locations. But this can be far from the real-world scenario in which travelers’ origins
and destinations are more likely to be clustered. In these situations, the insertion
heuristic can potentially perform even better. So it will be interesting to collect
real-world data and further evaluate the models and solution methods developed for
RSP.
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Algorithm 4.1: An insertion algorithm based on the optimal matching solution
input : Geolocations of customers and the optimal match solution
output: An improved ridesharing solution
SAVING = 0 ;
while true do
if UNMATCHED= ∅ then
break ;
end if
SOLUTION = ∅ ;
SAVING = 0 ;
for a ∈ UNMATCHED do
for r ∈ all routes do
for each feasible insertion position do
∆ = cost saving after insertion ;
if ∆ < SAV ING then
SAVING = ∆ ;
record the incumbent solution ;
end if
end for
end for
end for
if SAVING< 0 then
update UNMATCHED ;
update all routes ;
update SOLUTION ;
end if
else
break ;
end if
end while
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Table 4.1: Experiment results
Instance n Total cost Time (s) Gap
Solo Match Insertion MIP MIP
prob5a 5 2722.0 2338.2 2338.2 2338.2 0.3 -
prob5b 5 2378.4 2115.1 2115.1 2115.1 0.5 -
prob5c 5 3189.2 2856.0 2662.8 2662.8 0.3 -
prob5d 5 2086.3 1842.0 1842.0 1842.0 0.0 -
prob5e 5 2171.4 2171.4 2171.4 2171.4 0.8 -
prob10a 10 6109.6 4680.9 4680.9 4267.0 3600 8.95%
prob10b 10 5576.9 4965.5 4618.4 4487.1 3600 15.9%
prob10c 10 5514.1 4109.3 3591.9 3591.9 501.9 0.0%
prob10d 10 4126.2 3662.0 3662.0 3603.5 239.4 0.0%
prob10e 10 5302.8 4964.9 4810.3 4545.4 3600 5.0%
Table 4.2: Performance of algorithms - saving cost
Problem Total cost (saving%)
size Solo Match Insertion
5 2509.5 2264.5 (9.8%) 2225.9 (11.3%)
10 5325.9 4476.5 (15.9%) 4272.7 (19.8%)
15 7929.6 6654.7 (16.1%) 6499.7 (18.0%)
20 10561.8 8454.6 (19.9%) 8201.7 (22.4%)
25 12695.5 10430.8 (17.8%) 9826.4 (22.6%)
30 16490.1 12975.2 (21.3%) 12190.0 (26.1%)
35 18367.0 14327.1 (22.0%) 13576.6 (26.1%)
Table 4.3: Performance of algorithms - saving vehicles
Problem Vehicle trips (saving%)
size Solo Match Insertion
5 5 4.0 (20.0%) 3.8 (24.0%)
10 10 7.2 (28.0%) 5.8 (42.0%)
15 15 9.8 (34.7%) 8.2 (45.3%)
20 20 12.2 (39.0%) 9.8 (51.0%)
25 25 16.2 (35.2%) 11.6 (53.6%)
30 30 18.2 (39.3%) 13.8 (54.0%)
35 35 21.8 (37.7%) 15.8 (54.9%)
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5. COOPERATIVE RIDESHARING GAME
5.1 Introduction
In Section 4 the ridesharing optimization problem is modeled as a mixed-integer
program and the optimal solution is found to minimize the system-wide travel cost.
This is beneficial in the society’s point of view, assuming each agent accepts the
system’s assignment. This is, however, a strong assumption considering agents might
form their own ridesharing groups if they find doing so is more of their own interest.
Recall that the agents of ridesharing system participate in this system in the hope
of saving travel cost. So it is up to the ridesharing service provider to decide how the
travel cost would be shared among customers after a ridesharing plan is proposed
and accepted by the customers. This is a non-trivial task because if the agents find
the cost allocation scheme unfair, they may leave the system and form their own
ridesharing group in the long run. This fair cost-allocation situation is critical to the
sustainability of a ridesharing system and thus is the motivation of the study in this
section.
The ridesharing cost allocation problem is modeled as a cooperative game. Co-
operative game theory, due to its close relation to combinatorial optimization, has
drawn significant attention of the operations research community. Since its intro-
duction by von Neumannn and Morgenstern (1944), cooperative game theory has
developed several solution concepts that aim to resolve the benefits (cost) allocation
issues among cooperative players. In this section, we are primarily concerned with
a particular cost allocation solution concept - the nucleolus. The nucleolus of a co-
operative game has several nice properties. Intuitively, it is a solution to the cost
allocation problem that minimizes the maximal dissatisfaction among the customers.
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The concept of nucleolus was first suggested by Schmeidler (1969) and since then
was developed by Shapley (1967) and Maschler et al. (1979). Although the nucleolus
has several game theoretic virtues, the computation of nucleolus is very difficult. In
fact, for a n-player game, as the size of the characteristic function grows exponentially
with the number of players, any enumeration algorithm that computes the nucleolus
that requires the entire information of the characteristic function takes O(2n) time,
assuming the characteristic function is readily available. Moreover, as will be shown
in later section, finding the characteristic function value of ridesharing game involves
solving an optimization problem related to TSP, which is NP-hard itself. This means
the computation of the nucleolus of RSG can easily become intractable and more
efficient algorithm needs to be developed.
In this section, we utilize the nucleolus-finding procedure by successively solving
a number of linear programs. This technique was first proposed by Dragan (1981)
and Kopelowitz (1967). We combine this technique with a constraint generation
framework proposed in Hallefjord et al. (1995), such that the explicit information of
the characteristic function of a coalition is only computed when it is necessary. In
this way the computational burden is significantly reduced.
Note that the constraint generation approach was first proposed in Gilmore and
Gomory (1961) and was successfully applied to solving the cutting stock problem.
Utilizing a similar idea, Go¨the-Lundgren et al. (1996) studied the basic vehicle rout-
ing game (VRG) in which a fleet with homogeneous capacity are available. The
authors analyzed the properties of this game and proposed a nucleolus-finding pro-
cedure based on coalition generation. Engevall et al. (2004) generalized the model
of Go¨the-Lundgren et al. (1996) to consider vehicles with heterogeneous capacities
and studied a real-world case based on their model.
This section is organized as the following. In Section 5.2 the basics of cooperative
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game theory are covered. In Section 5.3, a formulation of the RSP cost allocation
problem is developed from a game theory perspective and the properties of the
characteristic function are analyzed. Section 5.4 discusses the fairness issues in the
RSP game regarding the core and the nucleolus. A coalition generation scheme is
then developed to compute the nucleolus. The constraint generation subproblem
is explicitly formulated by a mathematical formulation related to the ridesharing
optimization problem. In Section 5.5, numerical experiments are conducted and the
performance of the proposed nucleolus procedure is evaluated. Finally, conclusions
and future research ideas are presented in Section 5.6.
5.2 Cooperative Game Theory Background
In this section we discuss specifically cooperative games with transferable utility
(TU game), in which the earnings (costs) of a coalition can be expressed by one
number. A cooperative game with transferable utility is given by specifying a value
for every coalition. The game is defined by a tuple (N, v) where N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
is a finite set of players and v is a characteristic function v : 2S → R from the set of
coalitions of players in N to a set of payment schemes satisfying v(Ø) = 0. Here 2N
denotes the power set of N .
Definition 5.1 (Superadditivity). A TU game is superadditive if and only if
v(s ∪ t) ≥ v(s) + v(t), ∀s, t ⊆ S satisfying s ∩ t = Ø (5.1)
Definition 5.2 (Monotonicity). Larger coalitions have higher values.
v(s) ≤ v(t), ∀s ⊆ t ⊆ S (5.2)
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Definition 5.3 (Cohesiveness). A TU game is cohesive if we have
v(N) ≥
K∑
k=1
v(Sk) (5.3)
for every partition {S1, . . . , SK} of N .
Note that cohesiveness ensures that the equilibrium coalition will form.
5.2.1 Solution concepts
In a value game in which players have net profit, a solution concept is a payoff
vector x ∈ R|S| that dictates the value allocated to each player in S, i.e. the earnings
each player gets. In a cost game the payoff vector is the cost each player pays.
Definition 5.4 (Efficiency). A solution is efficient if the total value is divided exactly
by the payoff vector:
∑
i∈N xi = v(N).
Definition 5.5 (Individual rationality). A solution is individually rational if any
player gets at least as much as what he would get on his own: xi ≥ v({i}),∀i ∈ N
5.2.1.1 Imputation
Definition 5.6 (Imputation). A payoff vector is an imputation if it’s individually
rational and efficient at the same time.
5.2.1.2 The core
Definition 5.7 (Core). The core of a TU game is the set of payoff vectors
C(v) =
{
x ∈ RN :
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N);
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S),∀S ⊆ N
}
. (5.4)
In other words, the core of a game is the set of imputations under which no
coalition S has a value x(S) that is larger than its members’ payoffs’ summation.
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Thus no coalition has the incentive to leave the grand coalition.
5.2.1.3 The nucleolus
Let v : 2S → R denote the payoff characteristic function of a cooperative profit
game. Then the function gives the amount of collective payoff a set of players could
get through forming a coalition. The excess of x for a coalition S ⊆ N is defined as
e(x, S) = v(S) −∑i∈S xi. Let θ(x) ∈ R2N be the excess vector of x, with elements
v(S) − ∑i∈S xi arranged in non-increasing order, that is, θi(x) ≥ θj(x),∀i < j.
Note that a cost allocation vector x is in the core if and only if it is efficient and
θ1(x) ≤ 0. Consider the lexicographic ordering of excess vectors: for any two payoff
vectors x, y, θ(x) is said to be lexicographically smaller than θ(y) if ∃k such that
θi(x) = θi(y),∀i < k and θk(x) < θk(y). We denote this ordering by θ(x) ≺ θ(y).
Definition 5.8 (Nucleolus). The nucleolus of a cooperative game is the lexicograph-
ically minimal imputation. Denote the nucleolus by x and let X¯ be the set of impu-
tations, then we have
θ(x)  θ(x′), ∀x′ ∈ X\(x). (5.5)
The following bankruptcy game gives an example that clarifies the definition of
nucleolus.
Example 5.1 (The Bankruptcy Game). A company goes bankrupt and owes $10,000
to creditor A, $20,000 to creditor B and $30,000 to creditor C. If only $36,000 is
available for this company to cover these debts, how should this company split its
money to pay the creditors?
If the money is divided proportionally, the company would pay $6,000 to A,
$12,000 to B, and $18,000 to C. We denote this allocation by x = (6, 12, 18). We will
calculate the nucleolus of this game and compare it with the pro rata allocation.
41
First, we decide the characteristic function of this game. Apparently, v(∅) = 0
and v(ABC) = 36 in thousands of dollars. By himself A would not get anything
because B and C would split the whole amount; therefore we have v(A) = 0. v(B) = 0
similarly. For creditor C, even if A and B get the whole amount of their claim, that
is 30, 000, C would still get 36, 000− 30, 000 = 6, 000. Therefore we have v(C) = 6.
It is not hard to get v(AB) = 6, v(AC) = 16, and v(BC) = 26.
Table 5.1: Calculation of nucleolus - the bankruptcy game
S v(S) e(x, S) (6, 12, 18) (5, 12, 19) (5, 10.5, 20.5)
A 0 −x1 -6 -5 -5
B 0 −x2 -12 -12 -10.5
C 6 6− x3 -12 -13 -14.5
AB 6 6− x1 − x2 -12 -11 -9.5
AC 16 16− x1 − x3 -8 -8 -9.5
BC 26 26− x2 − x3 -4 -5 -5
Let x = (x1, x2, x3) be an efficient allocation (i.e., x1 + x2 + x3 = 36), we find the
excesses in Table 5.1. Note that we can ignore the empty set and the grand coalition
since they always have zero excesses. We start from the proportional allocation
(6, 12, 18). As is in Table 5.1, the excesses vector is θ = (−6,−12,−12,−12,−8,−4),
with the largest number −4 belonging to the coalition BC. The coalition of BC will
complain that every other coalition has a better excess value than it does. As a
result the next step is to improve BC’s excess by increasing x2 + x3 (i.e., decreasing
x1 as x1 = 36− x2 + x3). However, as we make the excess of BC smaller, the excess
of A will get larger synchronously. When x1 = 5, these two excesses meet at −5. It
is not hard to see that no matter how we select the values of x, the maximal excess
is at least −5 because at least one of A or BC would have an excess that is greater
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than or equal to −5. Therefore, x1 = 5 is in the nucleolus.
Since x1 is fixed, we choose x2 and x3 to make the next largest excess smaller.
Choosing the solution x = (5, 12, 19), we find that the largest excess excluding the
−5’s is −8 which belongs to coalition AC. In order to make e(x,AC) smaller, we
have to make x3 larger (make x2 smaller). However, when we do so the excesses of B
and AB will increase synchronously. Because coalition AB’s excess (−11) is closer to
−8, the nucleolus must be found when e(x,AB) = e(x,AC). Solving the equations,
16− x1 − x3 = 6− x1 − x2
x2 + x3 = 31
x1 = 5,
we find the nucleolus as (5, 10.5, 20.5).
Recall that we defined θ(x) as the excesses vector which is arranged in non-
increasing order. In this example, θ(x) = (−4,−6,−8,−12,−12,−12) when x =
(6, 12, 18). Similarly, let x′ = (5, 12, 19) and x′′ = (5, 10.5, 20.5), then θ(x′) =
(−5,−5,−8,−11,−12,−13) and θ(x′′) = (−5,−5,−9.5,−9.5,−10.5,−14.5). Recall
the definition of lexicographical ordering, since θ1(x
′) = −5 < θ1(x) = −4 we have
θ(x′) ≺ θ(x). Because θ3(x′′) = −9.5 < θ3(x′) = −8 we have θ(x′′) ≺ θ(x). There-
fore, θ(x′′) ≺ θ(x′) ≺ θ(x), meaning x′′ is the lexicographically minimal imputation
and thus the nucleolus.
5.3 RSP From A Game Theory Perspective
Consider a set of ridesharing participants and denote it by N . Each participant
wants to travel from her origin si to her destination ti. Denote the capacity of a
vehicle by Q. Consider the subsets of participants that do not exceed the vehicle
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capacity, i.e. |S| ≤ Q. For each such participant subset s, assume the feasible route
with minimum cost is known. Here by feasible it means the following conditions are
met
1. the route r starts from an agent d′s origin and ends at his destination.
2. Let s−d = s\{d}. For every agent i ∈ s−d, si precedes ti in r.
Denote by cr the cost of such a feasible route and by R the set of feasible routes
with minimal cost. Let air = 1 if participant i (both si and ti) is served by route r
and 0 otherwise. The RSP can be formulated as
(RSP) z = min
∑
r∈R
crxr (5.6)
s.t.
∑
r∈R
airxr = 1, i ∈ N (5.7)
xr ∈ {0, 1}, r ∈ R (5.8)
In the formulation xr = 1 if feasible route r is selected and 0 otherwise. Con-
straints (5.7) guarantee that each participant is covered by exactly one route. Note
that the coefficient cr in the objective function is obtained by finding the minimal
cost route that covers the participants for which air = 1, that is, by finding the
solution to the corresponding TSP with precedence constraints.
It is noted that this formulation is characterized by its large number of columns.
Therefore, this formulation is practically solvable by a column generation solution
method. Similar approaches were successfully applied to the vehicle routing problems
(VRP) (Balinski and Quandt, 1964; Desrochers et al., 1992, see). When we solve the
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RSP with a column generation approach, it is of our interest to reduce the number
of columns. We show this is possible as follows.
We first introduce the definition of the profitable ridesharing route.
Definition 5.9 (profitability). Denote by r(S) the corresponding minimum cost fea-
sible route of participant subset S. r(S) is non-profitable if there exists two non-
empty subsets S1 ∪ S2 = S, S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ such that cr(S) > cr(S1) + cr(S2). A route is
defined profitable otherwise.
Intuitively, a shared-ride route becomes non-profitable if by ridesharing the par-
ticipants end up spending more money on the transportation cost.
The following proposition shows that we only need to consider a subset of the
columns when solving RSP.
Proposition 5.1. Let X = {xr1 , xr2 , . . . , xrm} be an optimal solution to RSP, i.e.
xri = 1, i = 1, . . . ,m. Then ri,∀i = 1, . . . ,m must be a profitable route.
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Let X = {xr1 , xr2 , . . . , xrm} be an optimal solution
to RSP. Suppose there exists i∗ such that ri∗ is a non-profitable route. Let S∗ be
the corresponding participants that are covered by this route. Then by definition
there must be two non-empty subsets S∗1 ∪ S∗2 = S∗, S∗1 ∩ S∗2 = ∅ such that cr(S∗) >
cr(S∗1 )+cr(S∗2 ). Since all the customers that are covered by ri∗ are also covered by r(S
∗
1)
and r(S∗2), we can get a new feasible solution X
′ to RSP by substituting xri∗ = 1 with
xr(S∗1 ) = 1, xr(S∗2 ) = 1 and xri∗ = 0 while keep all the other x variables unchanged.
This feasible solution has a strictly less cost than X. Contradiction.
From a game theory perspective, we denote each ridesharing participant, i ∈ N ,
by a player and each subset of participants, S ⊆ N , by a coalition.
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The ridesharing cost allocation problem is the problem of finding a “fair” cost
allocation scheme for the ridesharing optimization problem (RSP).
A cooperative ridesharing game is defined by specifying a travel cost for each
coalition. The game is defined by a ridesharing group S, and a characteristic function
c(S) : 2S → R from the set of all possible coalitions (sub-ridesharing group) of players
in S to a set of payment schemes satisfying c(Ø) = 0. Here 2S denotes the power
set of S. In the context of RSP game the characteristic function can be seen as the
travel cost occurring if coalition S ⊆ N is formed. Each coalition can be defined by
a binary vector s as
si =

1, if customer i is a member of the coalition,
0, otherwise,
Define c as the objective value of a mathematical program. For all coalitions
S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅, let c(S) be the solution to the following mathematical program
c(S) = min
∑
r∈R
crxr (5.9)
s.t.
∑
r∈R
airxr = si, i ∈ N (5.10)
xr ∈ {0, 1}, r ∈ R (5.11)
Intuitively, c(S) represents the cost of an optimal route that covers the players
in S, i.e. the players for which si = 1. It is noted that this program is very similar
to VRP. In fact, the columns of this program can be reduced in a similar fashion as
VRP. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2. Let X = {xr1 , xr2 , . . . , xrm} be an optimal solution to C(S), i.e.
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xri = 1, i = 1, . . . ,m. Then ri,∀i = 1, . . . ,m must be a profitable route.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Proposition 5.1.
When studying a cooperative game, it is of great interest to study the properties
of its characteristic function. Assuming that the singleton coalitions have a positive
cost, we show the RSP game has the following properties. From here on we denote
by C(·) the mathematical program that defines the characteristic function value of
·, i.e. c(·).
Proposition 5.3 (Monotonicity). The characteristic function of the RSP game is
monotone, that is, c(S) ≤ c(T ), S ⊂ T ⊂ N .
Proof. Proof by contradiction. Suppose there exists S ⊂ T ⊂ N and c(S) > c(T ).
Let X = {xr|r ∈ R} be an optimal solution to C(T ). Let RT = {ri|xri = 1}. For
r ∈ R, we construct a feasible solution to C(S) in the following manner. Let
xr =

1, if ∃i ∈ S such that air = 1,
0, otherwise.
Let X ′ be the solution constructed in the above way. Denote by RS the set of
selected routes. Intuitively, we keep those routes in RT that covers at least one player
in S and discard those don’t.
It is known that X must satisfy
∑
r∈R
airxr = 1, i ∈ T
∑
r∈R
airxr = 0, i ∈ N − T
47
Because S ⊂ T , then X ′ must satisfy
∑
r∈R
airxr = 1, i ∈ S
∑
r∈R
airxr = 0, i ∈ T − S
∑
r∈R
airxr = 0, i ∈ N − T
This is equivalent to ∑
r∈R
airxr = si, i ∈ N
SoX ′ is a feasible solution to C(S). In addition, since the cost matrix {cij} is positive,
the route cost is also positive. Therefore the cost of X ′ is less than c(T ), which is
less than c(S). Note that c(S) is the optimal cost, so this is a contradiction.
Proposition 5.4 (Subadditivity). The characteristic cost function of RSP game is
subadditive, i.e., c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ), S, T ⊂ N,S ∩ T = ∅.
Proof. Let RS, RT be the optimal solution to C(S), C(T ), respectively. Because
S, T ⊂ N and S ∩ T = ∅, RS,T = RS ∪ RT must cover all the players in S ∪ T , i.e.
RS,T is a feasible solution to C(S ∪ T ). Since this solution has an objective value
equal to c(S) + c(T ), we have c(S) + c(T ) ≥ c(S ∪ T ).
It is noteworthy that subadditivity implies larger coalitions save more. So it is
always beneficial to include more people to participant in ridesharing and this is a
desirable property of the RSP game.
Denote a coalition S whose cardinality is smaller than the vehicle capacity (|S| ≤
Q) as a feasible coalition and otherwise as an infeasible coalition. Denote by S the
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set of feasible coalitions. Then we get
c(S) = cr, ∀r ∈ R and S ∈ S such that air = si, i ∈ N.
In addition, denote a coalition such that
∑
i∈S c(i) ≥ c(S) by a profitable coalition
and otherwise by a nonprofitable coalition.
(a) Profitable Coalition, c(S) = 13 (b) Nonprofitable Coalition,
c(S) = 11
Figure 5.1: Profitable vs. nonprofitable coalition
Figure 5.1 gives an example where forming a coalition will not always produce
desirable results: instead of reducing total transportation cost as Figure 5.1(a), Fig-
ure 5.1(b) actually increases the total cost, meaning it doesn’t make much sense to
form such a coalition. In this case the players are better off on their own. Note
that the profitability of forming a coalition in a large extent depends on the relative
geo-locations of the players.
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5.4 Fairness and Stability in RSP Game
5.4.1 The core and the nucleolus
5.4.1.1 The core
Let yi be the cost allocated to agent i, i ∈ N . The core of the RSP game is the
set of the cost allocation plans y, such that
∑
i∈N
yi = c(N), (5.12)
∑
i∈S
yi ≤ c(S), ∀S ⊂ N. (5.13)
The above inequalities can be interpreted as no single player or coalition should
make a payment that is greater than their cost on their own. A cost allocation
scheme that is in the core is a good allocation as no coalition has the incentive to
leave the grand coalition. An inequality in (5.13) is called a core defining inequality
(CDI).
It is observed that the number of CDIs is in the scale of O(2N). As will be shown
in later sections, in order to find the core and the nucleolus efficiently, it is important
and of our great interest to reduce the number of CDIs. This is possible through the
following propositions.
Proposition 5.5. Any CDI with a nonprofitable coalition S, S 6= N , is not needed
in (5.13).
Proof. Consider any nonprofitable coalition Sˆ, Sˆ 6= N . Denote by {1, 2, . . . ,m} the
players in Sˆ. By definition of nonprofitable coalition we have
∑
i∈Sˆ c(i) < C(Sˆ).
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Note that all individual players are also singleton coalitions. It follows that
yi ≤ c(i),∀i ∈ Sˆ =⇒
∑
i∈Sˆ
yi ≤
∑
i∈Sˆ
c(i) < c(Sˆ).
Proposition 5.6. (Go¨the-Lundgren et al., 1996) For a RSP game with non-empty
core, any CDI with an infeasible coalition S, S 6= N , is not needed in (5.13).
Proof. Let Sˆ, Sˆ 6= N be an infeasible coalition. Denote by {r1, . . . , rm} the corre-
sponding optimal routes and {s1, . . . , sm} the disjoint feasible coalitions correspond-
ing to the optimal routes. Since we have
∑m
j=1
∑
i∈Sj yi =
∑
i∈Sˆ yi and
∑m
j=1 c(Sj) =
c(Sˆ), then we have the following
∑
i∈Sj
yi ≤ c(Sj),∀j = 1, . . . ,m =⇒
∑
i∈Sˆ
yi ≤ c(Sˆ).
From Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.6 we have
C = {y|
∑
i∈S
yi ≤ c(S), S ∈ S;
∑
i∈N
yi = c(N)}.
Thus, when the core of the RSP game is non-empty, the only characteristic
function values of our interests are those corresponding to profitable and feasible
coalitions. This, as will be stated in later sections, reduces the size of the coalition-
generating subproblem dramatically. Note that the calculation of c(S) for a coali-
tion S is equivalent to solving the corresponding TSP with pick-up and drop-off
constraints for the customers for which si = 1.
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5.4.1.2 The nucleolus
Note that the previous definitions in Section 5.2 are based on value game. In
a cooperative ridesharing game, in which players share travel cost, allocations are
the payments each player need to pay. That is to say, cooperative ridesharing game
(RSP game) is a cost game.
Let c : 2S → R denote the cost characteristic function of a cooperative ridesharing
game. Then the function gives the amount of collective cost a group of players need
to pay through forming a coalition. Before we define the nucleolus of the RSP game,
first recall the definition of excess. In an RSP game, the excess of y for a coalition
S ⊆ N is defined as e(y, S) = c(S) −∑i∈S yi and measures the amount of cost-
saving of coalition S in the allocation y, compared to c(S). Note that when e(y, S)
is negative, it means the sum of the cost of S in the allocation y must exceed c(S).
Thus e(y, S) measures the dissatisfaction of S in the allocation y. Recall that the
core is defined as the set of imputations such that c(S) ≥ ∑i∈S yi for all coalitions
S, then we have that an imputation y is in the core if and only if all its excesses
are positive or zero. Denote by θ(y) ∈ R2N the excess vector of y whose elements
c(S) −∑i∈S yi are arranged in non-decreasing order, that is, θi(y) ≤ θj(y),∀i < j.
Then a cost allocation vector y is in the core if and only if it is efficient and θ1(y) ≥ 0.
Consider the lexicographic ordering of excess vectors: for two payment vectors x, y,
we say θ(x) is lexicographically greater than θ(y) if ∃k such that θi(x) = θi(y), ∀i < k
and θk(x) > θk(y). Denote this ordering by θ(x)  θ(y).
Definition 5.10 (Nucleolus). The nucleolus of a RSP game is the lexicographically
maximal imputation. Denote the nucleolus by y and let Y¯ be the set of imputations,
then we have
θ(y)  θ(y′), ∀y′ ∈ Y \y.
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Intuitively, the nucleolus minimizes the maximal dissatisfaction of all the coali-
tions in the ridesharing system. As a result, on the condition that the core is
nonempty, the nucleolus is the center of the core. It is of our interest to investi-
gate the non-emptiness of the core of RSP game because the definitions of nucleolus
and the core are related. In fact, the following example shows that the core of RSP
game may be empty.
Figure 5.2: A three player example
The transportation costs of three players 1, 2, 3 are given in Figure 5.2. Assuming
that each player’s vehicle has a capacity of one extra passenger seats, the character-
istic function of this 3-player game is then defined by c({1}) = c({2}) = c({5}) = 5,
c{1, 2} = c({2, 3}) = 7 (e.g., 1− 2− 2′ − 1′), c({1, 3}) = 9 (e.g., 1− 3− 3′ − 1′) and
c({1, 2, 3}) = 12. The optimal route configuration is, for example, 2− 3− 3′− 2′ and
1− 1′. We show the calculation of nucleolus of this example in Table 5.2.
As an initial guess, we try (4, 4, 4). In Table 5.2, we find that the minimum
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Table 5.2: Calculation of nucleolus - empty core
S c(S) e(y, S) (4, 4, 4) (42
3
, 22
3
, 42
3
)
1 5 5− y1 1 13
2 5 5− y2 1 213
3 5 5− y3 1 13
1 and 2 7 7− y1 − y2 = y3 − 5 -1 −13
2 and 3 7 7− y2 − y3 = y1 − 5 -1 −13
1 and 3 9 9− y1 − y3 = y2 − 3 1 −13
excess happens at coalition (1, 2) and (2, 3). These are the coalitions with maximum
dissatisfaction. To improve this, we must increase both y1 and y3. This involves
decreasing y2, and will decrease the excess for (1, 3) at the same rate. Also note that
player 1 and player 3 have symmetrical roles in this game, thus we can conclude that
the best scenario occurs when the excesses for (1, 2), (2, 3) and (1, 3) are all equal.
Solving the equations,
y3 − 5 = y1 − 5 = y2 − 3
y1 + y2 + y3 = 12,
we find the nucleolus of this game is y = (42
3
, 22
3
, 42
3
) and C = ∅ (note that
c(1, 2) < y1 + y2).
Interestingly, if we increase the capacity of the vehicles to two extra seat, then
we obtain a game with a nonempty core. In this case, the characteristic function
is defined in the following fashion. For the singleton coalitions and the 2-coalitions,
characteristic function values remain the same. However, for the grand coalition
c({1, 2, 3}) = 9. The optimal route configuration is, for example, 1−2−3−3′−2′−1′.
The calculation of nucleolus of this example is shown in Table 5.3.
Initially, we try (3, 3, 3). In Table 5.3, we find that the minimum excess happens
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Table 5.3: Calculation of nucleolus - nonempty core
S c(S) e(y, S) (3, 3, 3) (11
3
, 5
3
, 11
3
)
1 5 5− y1 2 4/3
2 5 5− y2 2 10/3
3 5 5− y3 2 4/3
1 and 2 7 7− y1 − y2 = y3 − 2 1 5/3
2 and 3 7 7− y2 − y3 = y1 − 2 1 5/3
1 and 3 9 9− y1 − y3 = y2 3 5/3
at coalition (1, 2) and (2, 3). These are the coalitions with maximum dissatisfaction.
To improve this, we must increase both y1 and y3. This involves decreasing y2, and
will decrease the excess for (1, 3) at the same rate. Also note that player 1 and
player 3 have symmetrical roles in this game, therefore we can conclude that the
best scenario we can achieve happens when the excesses for (1, 2), (2, 3) and (1, 3)
are all equal. Solving the equations,
y3 − 2 = y1 − 2 = y2
y1 + y2 + y3 = 9,
we find the nucleolus of this game is y = (11/3, 5/3, 11/3). Here, C 6= ∅ and the
nucleolus of this game is the center of the core.
These observations can be generalized below.
Proposition 5.7. (Go¨the-Lundgren et al., 1996) Let R be an optimal route configu-
ration of N , i.e. R consists of routes serving the players of feasible disjoint coalitions
S1, S2, . . . , Sm. Then we have
∑
j∈Sr
yj = c(Sr), ∀y ∈ C and 1 ≤ r ≤ m.
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Proof. Note that c(N) =
∑m
r=1 c(Sr) and
∑m
r=1
∑
j∈Sr yj =
∑
j∈N yj, ∀y ∈ Rn. In
addition any y ∈ C satisfies ∑j∈N yj = c(N) and ∑j∈Sr yj,∀1 ≤ r ≤ m. Therefore,
c(N) =
∑
j∈N yj =
∑m
r=1
∑
j∈Sr yj ≤
∑m
r=1 c(Sr) = c(N). It implies that all inequal-
ities must be equalities for this equation to hold, meaning
∑
j∈Sr yj = c(Sr), ∀y ∈
C and 1 ≤ r ≤ m.
Therefore, if the core of RSP game is nonempty, then the cost of an optimal route
should be split only among the players served by that route.
5.4.2 An algorithm to find the nucleolus
5.4.2.1 The master problem
Since the nucleolus is the cost allocation which minimizes the maximal dissatis-
faction, it can be represented by the solution to
max
y∈Y
min
∀S⊂N
(c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi),
which can be transformed to a linear program
(P 1) max w (5.14)
s.t. w ≤ c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi, S ∈ S (5.15)
∑
i∈N
yi = c(N). (5.16)
Notice that the LP program has O(|S|) constraints, and computing c(S), S ∈ S
involves solving the corresponding TSPPD. So the LP program can easily become
intractable. We therefore approach this problem with a constraint generation proce-
dure. Hallefjord et al. (1995) has suggested such an approach for linear programming
games. Go¨the-Lundgren et al. (1996) has used a similar approach to solve the vehicle
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routing problem (VRP) game.
Since before searching for the nucleolus, we should already know the solution to
the corresponding RSP, thus the optimal route configuration, we can start (P1) with
the coalitions corresponding to the optimal routes. Besides, the singleton coalitions’
cost values are readily available. Denote by Ω ∈ S the available coalitions, then (P1)
can be replaced by the following relaxed problem
(P 1M) max w (5.17)
s.t. w ≤ c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi, S ∈ Ω (5.18)
∑
i∈N
yi = c(N). (5.19)
If the solution to (P 1M) is unique, let it be (y
∗, w∗), i.e. θ1(y∗) > θ1(y′),∀y′ ∈
Y \{y∗}, then y∗ is the nucleolus of the game. If the solution to (P 1M) is not unique,
we continue to find the greatest θ2(y) among the y ∈ Y with θ1(y) = w∗. We continue
this process until the solution to the linear program is unique. At stage t the master
LP problem to be solved is
(P tM) max wt (5.20)
s.t. wt ≤ c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi, S ∈ S\
t−1⋃
τ=1
Γτ , (5.21)
wτ = c(S)−
∑
i∈S
yi, S ∈ Γτ , τ = 1, . . . , t− 1, (5.22)
∑
i∈N
yi = c(N). (5.23)
The solution to the last program in this series is the nucleolus of this game. Let
Πt,S be the dual variable corresponding to constraint w ≤ c(S) −
∑
i∈S yi. Let Γt
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denote the set of coalitions whose corresponding constraints are binding, that is,
 t = {S 2 S
St 1
⌧=1  ⌧ |⇧⇤t,S > 0}.
The essential idea of constraint generation approach is trying to find the nucleolus
with explicit information of only a small portion of the entire coalition set. This goal
is realized by finding the most violated constraint that is not yet included in ⌦ via
a subproblem after the master problem is solved at each stage. Denote the optimal
solution to (P 1M) by y
⇤ = (y⇤1, . . . , y
⇤
n). The constraint that is violated the most, aka
the most unhappy coalition given the cost allocation scheme y⇤, is obtained through
solving the following subproblem
(PS) min
S2S\⌦
c(S) 
X
i2S
y⇤i   w⇤
This nucleolus-finding procedure for a ridesharing game is developed based on
the theories and techniques proposed in Dragan (1981) and Kopelowitz (1967) and
a general constraint generation framework proposed in Hallefjord et al. (1995). The
pseudocode of this procedure is given in Algorithm 5.1. First, at stage t the master
LP problem P tM is solved and both the primal and dual solutions are returned.
Second, a subproblem PS is solved and the least satisfied constraint (s⇤) that is not
yet included is identified. If c⇤  0, then we include s⇤ in ⌦INEQ and resolve P tM
with newly included constraint wt  c(s⇤)  
P
i2s⇤ y
⇤
i . This stage iterates between
the master problem and the subproblem until no coalition violates the rationality
constraints of the master problem (i.e. c⇤   0). When this is achieved, we identify
the active and binding constraints, reformulate the master problem (modify ⌦INEQ
and ⌦EQ) and proceed to the next stage (t = t+1). This process continues until the
solution y⇤ to the master problem is unique. And this last solution is the nucleolus
of the RSP game. Note that in the procedure SP.addCut(s⇤), a cut of the type
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Algorithm 5.1: Procedure of finding the nucleolus of a cooperative ridesharing
game
input : Geolocations of customers
output: Nucleolus of the ridesharing game
t := 1 ;
⌦INEQ ;
STOP := false ;
while !STOP do
Solve a master problem P tM ;
Solve a subproblem PS ;
c⇤ = minS c(S) 
P
i2S y
⇤
i   w⇤ ;
s⇤ = argmin c(S) Pi2S y⇤i   w⇤ ;
if c⇤  0 then
SP.addCut(s⇤) ;
⌦INEQ := ⌦INEQ [ {s⇤} ;
end if
else
STOP := true ;
for every active and binding constraint s do
STOP := false ;
⌦INEQ := ⌦INEQ\{s} ;
⌦EQ := ⌦EQ [ {s} ;
end for
t := t+ 1 ;
end if
end while
of inequality (5.46) is added to the subproblem to prevent the duplication of row
associated with coalition s⇤.
5.4.3 Coalition generation subproblem – general
Recall in the nucleolus-finding scheme described in Algorithm 5.1, it involves
finding the most violated constraint in the subproblem. This is equivalent to finding
the “least satisfied” subset of customers with a given allocation proposal. A general
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formulation of the subproblem is thus
(P 0S) min
S∈S\Ω
c(S)−
∑
i∈S
y∗i − w∗ (5.24)∑
{i|sji=0}
si +
∑
{i|sji=1}
(1− si) ≥ 1, j|Sj ∈ Ω (5.25)
si ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ N (5.26)
Constraints (5.25) are preventing the re-generation of constraints.
Note that calculating c(S) is equivalent to solving the RSP model for customers
i ∈ S, i.e. those si = 1. This implies that we can formulate the subproblem
P 0S explicitly. Denote by G = (V,E) the graph of the RSP game with vertex set
V = VO ∪ VD ∪ {0} and edge set E = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ V, i 6= j}. Here vertex 0 is the
“dummy” depot such that any edge incident with it has a cost of 0. VO(VD) is the
origin (destination) vertex set of players in N . Each player is associated with a profit
(prize) equal to y∗i . The subproblem of the constraint generation procedure is to find
a subset of customers in N which maximizes the total prize minus the total cost,
while conforming to certain constraints.
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(P 1S) pi = max
∑
k∈N
y∗ksk −
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cijλij + w
∗ (5.27)
∑
{i|sji=0}
si +
∑
{i|sji=1}
(1− si) ≥ 1, j|Sj ∈ Ω (5.28)
λ0i − λ(i+n)0 = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (5.29)
2n∑
i=0
λik = sk, k ∈ N (5.30)
2n∑
i=0
λki = sk, k ∈ N (5.31)
2n∑
i=0
λi,k+n = sk, k ∈ N (5.32)
2n∑
i=0
λk+n,i = sk, k ∈ N (5.33)
ui − uj + pλij ≤ p− 1, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (5.34)
ui < ui+n, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (5.35)∑
k
yik = 1, i = 1, . . . , 2n; k = 1, . . . , n (5.36)
yik = y(i+n)k, i = 1, . . . , n; k = 1, . . . , n (5.37)
λ0i = yii, i = 1, . . . , n (5.38)
λij ≤M1(1− zij), 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (5.39)
−M2zij ≤ yik − yjk ≤M2zij, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n; k = 1, . . . , n (5.40)
xij ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (5.41)
yik ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1, . . . , 2n; k = 1, . . . , n (5.42)
zij ∈ {0, 1}, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (5.43)
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Easily to see, this program (P 1S) is closely related to the RSP model in Section 4.
This problem can be termed as prize-collecting RSP (see (Balas, 1989) for an analogy
of TSP and prize-collecting TSP). An explanation of the constraints in the model
can be found in Section 4.
5.4.4 Coalition generation subproblem – non-empty core
Recall that in Algorithm 5.1 searching the most violated constraint in each iter-
ation is a non-trivial task. Also recall that when the RSP game has a non-empty
core, the only coalitions that are non-redundant are the feasible coalitions. Notice
that c(S), S ∈ S is the minimum cost of a feasible route that covers the origin and
destination of all the players in S, that is, those si = 1, i ∈ N . This inspires us to
formulate the subproblem explicitly. Let G = (V,E) be the graph with vertex set
V = VO ∪ VD ∪ {0} and edge set E = {(i, j)|i, j ∈ V, i 6= j}. Here vertex 0 is the
“dummy” depot such that any edge incident with it has a cost of 0. VO(VD) is the
origin (destination) vertex set of players in N . Each player is associated with a profit
(prize) equal to y∗i . The constraint generation subproblem finds a feasible route in
G which maximizes the total prize minus cost, while conforming to the following
constraints
1. Exactly one player is assigned as the driver in the route
2. The route length does not exceed two times the seat capacity of a passenger
car Q
3. The route starts from the driver’s origin and ends at his/her destination
4. The pick-up drop-off precedence constraints are respected
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Denote the edge selection variable in the graph by λ. This problem is represented
by
(P 2S) pi = max
∑
k∈N
y∗ksk −
∑
i∈V
∑
j∈V
cijλij + w
∗ (5.44)
s.t.
∑
k∈N
sk ≤ Q (5.45)
∑
{i|sji=0}
si +
∑
{i|sji=1}
(1− si) ≥ 1, j|Sj ∈ Ω (5.46)
λ0i − λ(i+n)0 = 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (5.47)∑
k∈N
λ0k = 1 (5.48)
∑
k∈N
λk+n,0 = 1 (5.49)
2n∑
i=0
λik = sk, k ∈ N (5.50)
2n∑
i=0
λki = sk, k ∈ N (5.51)
2n∑
i=0
λi,k+n = sk, k ∈ N (5.52)
2n∑
i=0
λk+n,i = sk, k ∈ N (5.53)
ui − uj + pλij ≤ p− 1, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ 2n (5.54)
ui < ui+n, i = 1, 2, . . . , n (5.55)
λij ∈ {0, 1}, i, j ∈ V, i 6= j (5.56)
sk ∈ {0, 1}, k ∈ N (5.57)
Constraints (5.46) put the restriction that a constraint that is generated before
is not generated again. Constraints (5.45) are the capacity constraints and (5.47)
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forces a tour to start at a driver’s origin and end at a driver’s destination. Con-
straints (5.48) and (5.49) stipulate that exactly one player is assigned as the driver.
Constraints (5.50), (5.51), (5.52) and (5.53) are the flow balancing constraints for
each vertex. Constraints (5.54) are the subtour elimination constraints and (5.55)
are the precedence constraints.
It is not hard to notice that this program is closely related to the RSP model
developed in Section 4 and the explicit formulation P 1S in the previous subsection.
Note that although related, P 2S is much easier to solve than P
1
S .
5.5 Experiments
We have implemented the nucleolus algorithm (with both P 1S and P
2
S as subprob-
lem) in Java with CPLEX 12.6 and the Concert library. In this section, we first
show the results of nucleolus algorithm with P 2S as subproblem. Because P
2
S is much
easier to solve than P 1S , and the coalitions needed are much fewer in P
2
S than in P
1
S ,
nucleolus algorithm with P 2S can not only calculate the nucleolus when the RSP has
a non-empty core, but can also be used to find an approximate nucleolus when the
corresponding RSP has an empty core. Next, we show a comparison between the
nucleolus and the approximate nucleolus, obtained by using the nucleolus algorithm
with P 1S and P
2
S as the subproblem, respectively.
5.5.1 Approximate nucleolus
We report results for two instances of the 10-player problem, which is the largest
problem we have solved. As will be shown later, the computational bottleneck is not
at the nucleolus algorithm but at solving the corresponding ridesharing optimization
problem (RSP). The data set used here is the same as the data set in the experiments
of Section 4. Table 5.4 shows the geographical locations of the players. After solving
the RSP MIP model, the optimal ridesharing plan is {1}, {3, 5}, {4, 6, 7}, {8}, {2, 9},
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{10}. These, along with other singleton coalitions are used to generate the initial
constraints of the master LP problem.
At stage 1 three constraints are generated by solving the subproblem. They
correspond to the coalitions of {3, 4, 6}, {4, 6}, and {2, 3, 4, 5, 9}. Active constraints
corresponding to coalitions {8}, {10} and {1} are then identified at the end of stage
1. At stage 2, we notice that the solution to the master problem (P 2M) is unique,
thus we find the approximate nucleolus. The approximate nucleolus of this game is
listed in the last column of Table 5.4.
In total, 10 + 3 + 3 = 16 out of 210− 2 = 1022 constraints are needed to compute
the approximate nucleolus, which is only a very small fraction (1.6%).
Table 5.4: Data and approximate nucleolus of prob10c
Customer
Number
Pickup
Coordinates
Drop-off
Coordinates
Nucleolus
Cost
1 (387, 137) (918, 786) 346.2
2 (595, 4) (852, 236) 267.1
3 (514, 483) (9, 481) 627.5
4 (342, 655) (609, 55) 729.7
5 (715, 887) (372, 215) 434.3
6 (111, 687) (777, 91) 250.4
7 (692, 933) (203, 173) 97.5
8 (791, 847) (488, 312) 226.1
9 (702, 762) (928, 755) 520.8
10 (543, 443) (90, 700) 92.4
In our second experiment of prob10d (see Table 5.5), the optimal ridesharing con-
figuration is {1}, {2, 3, 4, 6}, {7}, {5, 8}, {9} and {10}. At stage 1, four constraints
are generated after via solving the subproblem. They correspond to the coalitions
of {2, 3, 4, 9}, {3, 6}, {2, 9} and {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. At stage 2, the master LP problem is
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found to have a unique solution. This solution is thus the approximate nucleolus of
this game. The approximate nucleolus is listed in the last column of Table 5.5. In
total, (10+2+4)/1022 ≈ 1.6% constraints were needed to compute the approximate
nucleolus.
Table 5.5: Data and approximate nucleolus of prob10d
Customer
Number
Pickup
Coordinates
Drop-off
Coordinates
Nucleolus
Cost
1 (60, 742) (34, 697) 52.0
2 (730, 471) (390, 845) 444.1
3 (964, 151) (39, 78) 808.7
4 (336, 763) (11, 332) 481.2
5 (330, 593) (570, 862) 326.9
6 (496, 333) (88, 346) 374.1
7 (168, 403) (432, 341) 271.2
8 (343, 502) (525, 846) 173.3
9 (600, 534) (585, 615) 83.0
10 (18, 952) (494, 605) 589.0
It is noteworthy to point out that the computational time for both instances
is very small (less than 10s), indicating the bottleneck is the optimization solution
method (recall this takes more than 100 seconds).
5.5.2 Nucleolus vs. approximate nucleolus
In this subsection we conduct two experiments to compare the actual nucleolus
and the approximate nucleolus. Finding the actual nucleolus by using Algorithm 5.1
with P 1S as subproblem is a very time-consuming process. In our first example,
problem8a, it takes 5 hours to find the actual nucleolus. In our second example,
problem8b, the time it takes to find the actual nucleolus goes up to 20 hours.
The actual nucleolus cost and approximate nucleolus cost are summarized in
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Table 5.6 and Table 5.7. As we can see, the solutions obtained by the approximate
nucleolus algorithm are a close approximation for the actual nucleolus in both cases.
It is of our interest to see the computational performance of Algorithm 5.1 using
P 1S and P
2
S . In problem8a, a total of 193 constraints are generated by P
1
S , comparing
to a total of 9 constraints generated by P 2S . In problem10d, a total of 184 coalitions
are generated by P 1S , comparing to a total of only 9 coalitions generated by P
2
S . Note
that the total number of coalitions (not including the empty set and the universal
set) is 28 − 2 = 254 for problem8a and problem8b. Therefore, Algorithm 5.1 using
P 1S generated 193/254 = 76% and 184/254 = 72% of the total constraints to find
the nucleolus in problem8a and problem8b, respectively. So Algorithm 5.1 using
P 1S is more like an enumeration procedure. Thus P
2
S is much more computationally
efficient than P 1S . Since the number of constraints generated by P
1
S are significantly
higher than that of P 2S . This along with the fact that P
1
S is much harder to solve
than P 2S explains the significant time difference between Algorithm 5.1 using P
1
S and
P 2S .
In Figure 5.3 and 5.4 we measure the Euclidean distance between the incum-
bent nucleolus and the actual nucleolus (
√∑
i∈N(y
∗
i − yi)2) as the algorithm iter-
ates. These two figures show the solution path of the algorithm in both cases. As
can be seen, in both cases, the algorithm found the nucleolus before it stopped. This
happened before the 20th iteration in problem8a, and before 75 constraints were
generated in problem8b. It means the majority of the running time of this algorithm
is consumed after the actual nucleolus is found.
5.6 Conclusions
In this section, we studied an important problem faced by ridesharing service
provider: how to allocate cost among ridesharing participants to ensure sustainabil-
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Table 5.6: Nucleolus vs. approximate nucleolus – problem8a
Customer
Number
Nucleolus
Cost
Approximate
Nucleolus Cost
1 442.1 449.9
2 505.0 512.8
3 639.2 636.6
4 409.3 406.7
5 527.6 525.0
6 465.8 463.2
7 228.4 225.8
8 519.4 516.8
Table 5.7: Nucleolus vs. approximate nucleolus – problem8b
Customer
Number
Nucleolus
Cost
Approximate
Nucleolus Cost
1 366.5 366.5
2 507.1 457.7
3 594.1 617.1
4 387.6 456.7
5 1012.5 1035.6
6 258.1 235.1
7 545.3 571.8
8 235.9 166.8
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Figure 5.3: Solution path – problem8a
Figure 5.4: Solution path – problem8b
ity and fairness. This fair cost allocation problem was modeled as a cooperative
game. A special property of the cooperative ridesharing game is that, its character-
istic function values are calculated by solving an optimization problem. To better
understand this game, we further studied the characteristic function and proved
it to be monotone, subadditive, but non-convex. We then proposed an iterative
constraint-generation algorithm (Algorithm 5.1) for calculating the nucleolus of the
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RSP game in two situations – the game has an empty core and the game has a
non-empty core. In both cases the algorithm utilizes an explicitly formulated MIP
as the subproblem to generate constraints. When the game has an empty core, the
algorithm uses P 1S as the subproblem and becomes an enumeration procedure to find
the nucleolus of the game. When the game has a non-empty core, this algorithm uses
P 2S as the subproblem which utilizes the special properties of the RSP game such that
the characteristic function values are computed only when they are needed. There-
fore the number of subproblems (an NP-hard optimization problem) that need to be
solved is significantly reduced. Experiments showed that by adopting this algorithm
with P 2S only a small fraction (1.6%) of the coalition constraints were needed to find
the nucleolus. It is also found in the experiments that when the emptiness of the RSP
game is unclear, the algorithm with P 2S can be used to find an approximate nucleolus
that is close to the actual nucleolus. This indicates that our proposed algorithm is
promising in finding nucleolus of dynamic, large-scale RSP game.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Ridesharing services, whose aim is to gather travelers with similar itineraries
and compatible schedules, are able to provide substantial environmental and social
benefits through reducing the use of private vehicles. When the operations of a
ridesharing system is optimized, it can also save travelers a significant amount of
transportation cost. The economic benefits associated with ridesharing in turn at-
tract more travelers to participate in ridesharing services and thereby improve the
utilization of transportation infrastructure capacity.
The first part of the dissertation formally defined the large-scale ridesharing op-
timization problem (RSP), characterized its complexity and discussed its relation to
classic relevant problems such as TSP and VRP. A mixed-integer program is devel-
oped to solve RSP to optimality. Since RSP is NP-hard, heuristic algorithms are
then developed to efficiently solve larger instances of RSP. The quality of heuristic
solutions are evaluated by using the optimal matching solutions (see Wang, 2013)
and the MIP solutions as benchmarks. Experimental results showed that adopting
ridesharing can save a significant amount of travelers’ cost and vehicle trips. It was
also found that solutions produced by heuristic are good-enough approximations of
the optimum and outperformed the matching solution by a non-trivial margin.
From a societal perspective, the RSP models can provide a ridesharing plan that
minimizes the system-wide travel cost. However, the system-level optimal solution
might not completely align with individual participants’ interest. The second part of
this dissertation formulates the fair cost allocation problem in ridesharing through
the lens of cooperative game theory. An algorithm based on coalition generation
techniques is developed to find the nucleolus and approximate nucleolus of the game.
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This algorithm utilizes a master-slave problem solving structure with the subproblem
explicitly formulated. Different subproblems are used in different situations. Exper-
iments showed that this algorithm can save a significant amount of computational
resources compared to the enumeration method.
Future research directions might include (1) developing heuristic or algorithms
to solve the RSP MIP model more efficiently and (2) investigating other solution
concepts in cooperative game theory such as the Shapley value. Anticipating that a
dynamic large-scale ridesharing system might emerge in the foreseeable future, it is
not computationally practical to find the optimal solution repeatedly when agents
consistently join and leave the system. So it is of interest to study nearly-fair cost
allocation schemes under a nearly-optimal ridesharing plan.
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